Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 4

Article 7

Fall 9-1-2013

An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under The ADA
Amendments Act
Stephen F. Befort

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Disability Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under The ADA Amendments
Act , 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2027 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol70/iss4/7
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

An Empirical Examination of Case
Outcomes Under The ADA
Amendments Act
Stephen F. Befort*
Abstract
Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in
order to override four Supreme Court decisions that had narrowly
restricted the scope of those protected by the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and to provide “a national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination.” This Article undertakes an
empirical examination of the impact of the ADAA on case
outcomes. The recent reported cases provide a unique opportunity
for such an examination because, with the ADAAA not
retroactively applicable to cases pending prior to its effective date,
courts have been simultaneously deciding cases under both the
pre-amendment and post-amendment standards. This study
examines all reported federal court summary judgment decisions
arising under Title I of the ADA for a forty-month period
extending from January 1, 2010, to April 30, 2013. The study
coded the pre-ADAAA and post-ADAAA decisions for both
disability standing determinations and for rulings on whether the
plaintiff was qualified for the job in question. These preliminary
data show that the federal courts are granting employers a
significantly smaller proportion of summary judgment rulings
under the ADAAA on the basis of a lack of disability status. In
addition, the ADAAA decisions exhibit a greater prevalence of
rulings on the issue of whether the plaintiff is a qualified
individual. On the other hand, the post-amendment decisions
show an increased tendency for the courts to find that the plaintiff
is not qualified. While the rate of increase in plaintiff victories on
* Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Jillian Pearson for her assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
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the disability issue is outpacing the rate of increase in plaintiff
losses on the qualified issue, the latter phenomenon suggests a
continuing judicial unease with disability discrimination claims
generally and with reasonable accommodation requests more
specifically.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................... 2029
II. The Supreme Court’s Contraction of the ADA’s
Definition of Disability .................................................. 2032
III. The ADAAA ................................................................... 2040
A. The Path to a Congressional Override .................... 2040
B. A Summary of the ADAAA ...................................... 2042
IV. Empirical Methodology.................................................. 2045
A. Identifying the Cases .............................................. 2046
B. Coding the Outcomes .............................................. 2048
V. The Findings .................................................................. 2049
A. The Delayed Effect of the ADAAA .......................... 2049
B. Disability Status ...................................................... 2050
C. Qualified Status....................................................... 2054
VI. A Closer Look at Three Assumptions............................ 2057
A. Assumption 1—Fewer Summary Judgment
Rulings Denying Disability Status ......................... 2057
1. Mitigating Measures.......................................... 2058
2. Episodic Impairments........................................ 2059
3. The "Regarded as" Prong ................................... 2062
B. Assumption 2—An Enhanced Focus on
Qualified Status....................................................... 2064
C. Assumption 3—Higher Win Rates for ADA
Plaintiffs .................................................................. 2066
VII. Conclusions .................................................................... 2069

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION

2029

I. Introduction
Both houses of Congress unanimously approved the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),1 and President George W.
Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25, 2008.2 The
ADAAA, which went into effect on January 1, 2009,3 explicitly
disavows the reasoning of four earlier Supreme Court decisions
that had narrowed the scope of the Americans with Disabilities
Act’s (ADA) disability definition.4 A principal objective of
Congress in enacting the ADAAA was to refocus the ADA on
issues of discrimination rather than on issues of standing.5
Both legislators and commentators have lauded the ADAAA
as landmark legislation that will broadly empower employees
asserting disability discrimination claims.6 This contention is
premised upon a number of frequently asserted assumptions. The
first assumption is that the ADAAA will result in fewer summary
judgment rulings finding that claimants lack standing as covered
individuals with a disability.7 The second assumption is that the
amendments will result in a greater proportion of cases being
determined on the basis of whether the claimant is a qualified
individual with or without a reasonable accommodation.8 The third
1. 154 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H8286
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
3. Id. § 8.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3)–(4) (2012) (noting that the purpose of the
chapter is to “invoke the sweep of congressional authority” and “address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities”).
5. See 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (stating that the
ADAAA would refocus emphasis on whether discrimination occurred rather
than whether an impairment qualifies as a disability).
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012) (describing the purpose of the
ADAAA as to provide a “national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination”); Jason Lewis, A Change for the Better?: The ADA Amendments
Act Of 2008, 14 PUB. INT. L. REP. 203, 206 (2009) (noting that numerous
disability rights groups were pleased with the legislation).
7. See Evan Sauer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Mitigating
Measures Issues, No Longer a Catch-22, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 215, 236 (2010)
(predicting that due to the ADAAA’s broad definition of disability, “it is less
likely that employers will be able to succeed on a motion for summary
judgment”).
8. See Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act
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and final assumption is that the combination of these factors will
result in higher overall win rates for ADA plaintiffs.9
Most commentators have applauded the apparent expansion of
ADA coverage, with Professor Kevin Barry, for example, asserting
that “the ADAAA is a radical step in the right direction.”10 Some
commentators even think that the ADAAA increases the class of
disabled individuals too expansively so as unwisely to benefit
individuals who are not truly disabled or in need of protection.11 But
some commentators, including myself, have expressed skepticism
about whether the ADAAA will actually affect such a dramatic
change in outcomes.12 One reason for such skepticism is that the
ADAAA retained the same basic definition of who is a covered
individual with a disability, and courts once again may interpret this
language narrowly in order to avoid overloaded dockets.13 In addition,
of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory
Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1022 (stating that “the new
focus likely will center more on whether an individual is qualified to perform the
job in question”); Carol J. Miller, EEOC Reinforces Broad Interpretation of
ADAAA Disability Qualification: But What Does “Substantially Limits” Mean?,
76 MO. L. REV. 43, 74 (2011) (stating that “the issue of whether the individual’s
requested accommodation is reasonable will emerge more frequently”).
9. See Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 667, 670 (2010) (predicting that the ADAAA “will
increase the win rate of plaintiffs in ADA Title I cases”).
10. Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203,
208 (2010); see also Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans
with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 217, 229 (2008) (describing the ADAAA as “long overdue”).
11. See, e.g., Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates,
47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 331, 336 (2010) (stating that the ADAAA “will inevitably
generate a flood of litigation by individuals who should not be protected”); Jones,
supra note 9, at 669 (arguing that the ADAAA has responded to a former
problem of underinclusiveness with a new problem of overinclusiveness).
12. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 8, at 1024–25 (“The original version of the
ADA used the same ‘substantially limits’ language and the EEOC followed by
issuing relatively broad interpretative guidelines. But the courts ignored or
disapproved of many of the most significant guidelines and interpreted the term
‘substantially limits’ narrowly.”); Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact
of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 419,
421 (2011) (“The ADAAA was intended to reverse the effects of several Supreme
Court decisions that limited the coverage of the ADA and to broaden the
coverage of the ADA . . . . Yet the ADAAA may not resolve all of the issues that
Congress or disability advocates wanted to address.”).
13. See Paul R. Klein, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Pendulum
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many courts have not been receptive to the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation requirement, finding it to go beyond a simple ban on
discrimination to encompass an uncomfortable preferential-treatment
mandate.14 In short, the judiciary that previously undercut the
promise of the initial version of the ADA may find similar incentives
with respect to the attempted ADAAA expansion.
This Article undertakes an empirical examination of how the
ADAAA has impacted actual case outcomes. The recent reported
cases provide a unique opportunity for such an examination because,
with the ADAAA not retroactively applicable to cases pending prior to
its effective date,15 courts have been simultaneously deciding cases
under both the pre-amendment and post-amendment standards. This
study examines all reported federal court summary judgment
decisions arising under Title I of the ADA for a forty-month period
extending from January 1, 2010, to April 30, 2013. The study coded
these pre-ADAAA and post-ADAAA decisions for both disability
standing determinations and for rulings on whether the plaintiff is
qualified for the job in question. The study also identified the types of
impairments at issue in the two comparator sets of data.
These preliminary data show that the federal courts are granting
employers a significantly smaller proportion of summary judgment
Swings Back, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 467, 488 (2010) (stating that
“[m]aintaining the substantially limits language [in the ADAAA] could increase
the likelihood that the courts will relapse into their previous textualist approach
to the statute and interpret the language restrictively”).
14. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights
Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 50 (2000) (stating that many courts
view the notion of reasonable accommodation as “requests for special benefits”);
Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with
Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311,
320 (2009) (suggesting that “the ADAAA actually may reinvigorate the backlash
as the accommodation mandate becomes more visible and more contested”);
Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1819−20 (2005) (stating that courts
think of accommodations as “an unwelcome species of affirmative action”).
15. See, e.g., Carraras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir.
2010) (rejecting application of the ADAAA where the underlying activity
occurred prior to the passage of the amendments); EEOC v. Argo Distrib., LLC,
555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that though Congress passed the
ADAAA, the changes did not apply retroactively); Milholland v. Sumner Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 565−67 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting application of the
ADAAA because it does not apply retroactively to govern conduct occurring
before the Act became effective).
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rulings under the ADAAA on the basis of a lack of disability status. In
addition, the ADAAA decisions exhibit a greater prevalence of rulings
on the issue of whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual. On the
other hand, the post-amendment decisions show an increased
tendency for the courts to find that the plaintiff is not qualified. While
the rate of increase in plaintiff victories on the disability issue is
outpacing the rate of increase in plaintiff losses on the qualified issue,
the latter phenomenon suggests the potential for lower overall win
outcomes for ADAAA plaintiffs than might have been expected.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II briefly chronicles the
Supreme Court’s contraction of the disability definition under the
original version of the ADA. Part III discusses the ADAAA override
generally. Part IV then describes the methodology of this empirical
study, while Part V describes the study’s findings. The Article
concludes in Part VI, which takes a closer look at the postamendment decisions to determine if the ADAAA is functioning as
anticipated.
II. The Supreme Court’s Contraction of the ADA’s Definition of
Disability
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)16 was originally
enacted in 1990 with considerable fanfare and support. President
George H.W. Bush, in signing the ADA into law, described the new
statute as “an historic opportunity” representing “the full flowering of
our democratic principles.”17 Disability rights activists were
optimistic18 that the new legislation would accomplish its stated
purpose of providing a “national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”19
The ADA’s ban on disability-based discrimination, however, was
not simply an extension of the antidiscrimination principles embodied
16. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006)).
17. Presidential Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1070, 1070 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 601−02.
18. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that the ADA was “enacted
amid hopes that it would have a sweeping impact”).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
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in the previously enacted Title VII, which bans discrimination
“because of” certain listed characteristics.20 Paraphrasing three
different portions of the statute,21 the ADA’s original
antidiscrimination formula can be stated as follows: No employer
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual when the individual, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position, unless the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of
that employer.22 The ADA’s antidiscrimination formula, accordingly,
is more complicated than Title VII’s in two significant respects. First,
while Title VII protects everyone against discrimination on the basis
of race or gender, only individuals who have a qualifying disability
have standing to assert a claim under the ADA.23 Second, in
ascertaining whether an employer is discriminating in violation of the
ADA, the statute asks whether the employee is qualified for the job
“with or without reasonable accommodation,”24 unless such
accommodation would impose an “undue hardship.”25
In defining a covered disability, the ADA borrowed the
Rehabilitation Act’s three-pronged definition of a “handicapped
individual,” except with the term “disability” substituted for the term
20. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
21. Id. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A).
22. Id. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A).
23. See id. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability . . . .”).
24. Id. § 12112(a). Title VII generally does not impose any affirmative
obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfactorily performing the
essential functions of their jobs, but instead merely invokes a negative
prohibition against discrimination. See Diller, supra note 14, at 40–44
(contrasting how the ADA employs a different-treatment model of
discrimination with how most antidiscrimination statutes employ an equaltreatment model of discrimination). Title VII does impose a duty on an employer
to accommodate the religious observances and practices of its employees. See
§ 2000e(j) (stating that “religion” includes all aspects of observance and practice
unless an employer can demonstrate that they are unable to reasonably
accommodate the observance or practice without undue hardship). But the
Supreme Court has construed this duty as far more limited than that imposed
by the ADA. See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (ruling that an
employer need not incur more than a de minimis hardship in providing an
accommodation for religious purposes).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006). The term “undue hardship” is defined
as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” Id. § 12111(10)(A).
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“handicapped.”26 Under the ADA, “the term ‘disability’ means, with
respect to an individual: (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment.”27
The federal courts generally adopted a broad reading of the
disability definition under the Rehabilitation Act. Professor Chai
Feldblum, in reviewing pre-ADA-era decisions, summarized her
findings as follows:
Courts deciding cases under [the Rehabilitation Act’s]
definition had decided that individuals with a wide range of
serious medical conditions could invoke the protections of the
law. Indeed, courts had rarely even parsed the language of the
definition to decide whether a plaintiff was a “handicapped
individual” under the law. Rather, the definition was
understood to include any medical condition that was nontrivial, and the courts had applied the law’s coverage in that
manner.28

Many activists and observers were optimistic that the ADA
was structured to go a long way toward achieving the stated
objective of eradicating disability discrimination.29 But the
optimists overlooked one important fact: unlike the allencompassing nature of race and gender under Title VII, the
notion of disability under ADA is a term of limitation.30 While
everyone has a race and gender, not everyone is disabled. If the
26. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(2006)); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (explaining that
“[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim” from the
Rehabilitation Act).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
28. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91–92 (2000).
29. See Diller, supra note 14, at 19 (“The bill was signed into law on July
26, 1990 at a White House ceremony attended by 2,000 supporters, including
many people with disabilities. The event was an emotional watershed marked
by tears and jubilation. Many present referred to it as a second independence
day.”).
30. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:
Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability
Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 69 (1999) (stating that “[t]he ADA is
very different” because “[o]nly individuals who meet the statute’s definition of
‘disability’ are protected”).

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION

2035

threshold for establishing disability status is raised, the scope of
protection afforded by the Act is correspondingly reduced.
The enactment of the ADA contributed to a significant rise in
the incidence of employment litigation. In the four years following
1991, the number of employment claims in federal court jumped
by 128%.31 Between the ADA’s effective date in 1992 and the end
of fiscal year 1998, claimants filed more than 108,000 charges of
disability discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).32 This litigation explosion,
coupled with the rather imprecise language of the statute,
resulted in conflicting judicial interpretations on a host of key
ADA issues33 and led the Supreme Court to decide sixteen cases
construing the ADA in a relatively short time span from 1998 to
2004.34 This increased activity also tested the patience of the
31. Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of
Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 22 (1997).
32. Befort & Thomas, supra note 30, at 29–30 (citing EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA)
CHARGES, FY 1992–FY 1998 (1998)).
33. See, e.g., id. at 31−41 (describing ten contentious ADA issues on which
the circuit courts, the EEOC, or both, took conflicting positions and also
discussing the reasons for this widespread judicial dissonance).
34. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (determining that
because due process protects the right of access to courts, Title II of the ADA
constitutes a valid exercise of congressional authority to enforce that
substantive guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment); Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003) (distinguishing between disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact claims under the ADA); Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 n.6 (2003) (noting that the ADA does not
helpfully define the term “employee,” and using cases construing similar
language to fill in the gap); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2002)
(determining that punitive damages cannot be awarded under section 2 of the
ADA); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002) (determining
that an EEOC regulation authorizing refusal to hire an individual if job
performance would endanger his or her health was permissible under the ADA);
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002) (noting that an employer’s
showing that an accommodation would conflict with their seniority system is
generally sufficient to show that the accommodation is not reasonable); EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296–98 (2002) (deciding that an arbitration
agreement did not preclude the EEOC from pursuing employee judicial relief);
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (determining
that a substantial limitation in the activity of performing life tasks must be
guided by the ADA disability definition); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.
661, 690 (2001) (deciding that Title III of the ADA prohibits denial of access to
the golf tournament and that use of a golf cart is not a modification that would
fundamentally alter the nature of a golf tournament); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
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federal judiciary charged with managing the caseload, as
illustrated by the following comment:
The court advised that the ADA as it was being interpreted
had the potential of being the greatest generator of litigation
ever, and that the court doubted whether Congress, in its
wildest dreams or wildest nightmares, intended to turn every
garden variety worker’s compensation claim into a federal
case.35

Beginning in 1999, the Supreme Court significantly
narrowed the class of protected “disabled” employees through a
series of four decisions. The most significant of these decisions
was Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.36 in which the Court ruled
that mitigating measures, such as medication and prosthetic
devices, should be taken into account in determining whether a
person is disabled for purposes of the ADA.37 The Court also ruled
in that case that a plaintiff is not protected under prong three of
the disability definition by virtue of being regarded as disabled
unless the employer perceives the plaintiff’s impairment as one
that would substantially limit a major life activity.38 Two
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (determining that the requirements for
private individuals to recover monetary damages against the State were not
met); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1999) (outlining
the ADA’s definition of a disability and the extent to which it limits a major life
activity); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999)
(determining that the ADA requires that a determination of “substantially
limits” be made in reference to the mitigating measures the disabled individual
employs); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492–94 (1999) (deciding
that the ADA requires that determination of a disability must be made with
reference to mitigating measures); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526
U.S. 795, 805–07 (1999) (determining that Social Security Disability Claims and
ADA claims do not necessarily conflict, but in order to defeat summary
judgment, a reasonable juror must be able to conclude that the plaintiff could
perform the essential functions of the job); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 647
(1998) (deciding that respondent’s HIV infection did qualify as a disability); Pa.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (determining that state
prisons fall within the Title II definition of a “public entity,” and the ADA is
thus extended to state prison inmates).
35. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485 (W.D. Ark. 1994), rev’d,
60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995).
36. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
37. See id. at 482 (rejecting EEOC guidance, found at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)
(1998), suggesting that disability status should be determined without regard to
the effect of mitigating measures).
38. Id. at 489.
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companion decisions issued on the same day as Sutton reached
similar results.39 The Court further restricted the disability
standing requirement three years later in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams40 when it overturned a
Sixth Circuit decision that had found an assembly line worker
with carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis to be substantially
limited in performing manual tasks because of her workplace
difficulties in gripping tools and in performing repetitive work.41
The Supreme Court explained that the proper inquiry was to
determine whether an individual has “an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from [engaging in]
activities that are of central importance to [daily life].”42 The
Court stated that the terms “substantially limits” and “major life
activity” “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled.”43
The most obvious impact of these decisions was to narrow the
ADA’s protected class and to raise the bar for ADA plaintiffs in
litigation. This impact is demonstrated by several statistical
measures. First, the timing of the Sutton decision correlates with
a significant decline in the number of charges of alleged
discrimination filed under the ADA. The EEOC’s charge-filing
statistics show a drop in annual ADA charges from the 17,000 to
18,000 range during fiscal years 1997 to 1999, to a range of
15,000 to 16,000 charges filed in each of the four fiscal years
following the Sutton decision.44 Federal court filings for
39. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 518 (1999) (ruling
that an employee with hypertension was not disabled when mitigating effects of
medication are taken into consideration); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555, 565−66 (1999) (finding that monocular vision was not a disability for
an individual whose brain had developed mechanisms to compensate for loss of
vision in one eye).
40. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
41. See id. at 192–93 (holding that a substantially limiting impairment is
one that prevents or severely restricts an individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives).
42. Id. at 198.
43. Id. at 196–97.
44. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges (Includes Concurrent Charges with Title VII, ADEA,
and EPA) FY 1997–FY 2012, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
ada-charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).

2038

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027 (2013)

employment-based civil rights cases similarly declined from
23,735 in 199845 to 20,955 in 2002 and 14,353 in 2006.46 These
numbers suggest that Sutton and its progeny served to deter the
assertion of discrimination claims under the ADA.
Second, several empirical studies found that the federal
courts saw little merit in those ADA claims that were asserted.
Professor Ruth Colker, for example, conducted a detailed analysis
of decided ADA federal court decisions and reported that the
courts resolved approximately 93% of these cases in favor of
employers.47 Many of these decisions were the result of summary
judgment rulings based upon a determination that the plaintiff
lacked disability status.48 Another study undertaken by Professor
Colker revealed that the federal courts of appeal are far more
likely to overturn trial court rulings favorable to ADA plaintiffs
than they are to take similar action with respect to appeals
arising under Title VII.49
Following the four restrictive Supreme Court decisions,
courts generally found many very serious impairments not to be
disabling. Most courts, for example, concluded that individuals
45. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE C-2A. U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 THROUGH 2002, at 133 (2002),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2002/
appendices/c02asep02.pdf.
46. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE C-2A. U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 THROUGH 2006, at 166 (2006),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/
front/completejudicialbusiness.pdf.
47. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999) (explaining how the
author determined that 93% of both appealed and unappealed ADA trial court
outcomes were in favor of defendants).
48. See id. at 110–16 (arguing that summary judgment rulings on ADA
claims routinely include decisions on genuine issues of material fact); Befort &
Thomas, supra note 30, at 80 (“The most common justification for [employers
prevailing in 93% of all court rulings involving ADA claims] is a stringent
interpretation of the ‘disability’ and ‘reasonable accommodation’ concepts.”).
49. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 253–54 (2001) (comparing data on
appellate reversals in ADA and Title VII cases).
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who could control their diabetes through medication were not
disabled.50
Similar outcomes typically occurred for other impairments
subject to mitigation such as epilepsy and depression.51 Likewise,
most courts prior to the ADAAA found chronic illnesses that are
episodic in nature are not disabling. For example, a number of
courts ruled that cancer was not a disabling condition because its
effects are episodic and subject to periods of remission.52
Most of the scholarly response to this restrictive trend was
decidedly negative. The loudest detractors, including some longtime disability-rights activists, viewed these decisions as
subverting the bold civil rights intent of Congress in enacting the
ADA.53 The clear consensus reaction, even from those
50. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264
(11th Cir. 2007) (finding that Greenberg’s obesity and diabetes were not
disabilities for the purposes of the ADA in this case because they did not
“substantially limit” a “major life activity”); Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166,
179 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that the appellants could not prove that their
diabetes, cardiac problems, and use of hearing aids were “not mitigated by
corrective measures, thus barring a claim that they have impairments that limit
a major life activity”); Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916, 919–22 (7th Cir. 2006)
(determining that there was not enough evidence in the record to find that
Scheerer’s medication-controlled diabetes severely restricted any major life
activities).
51. See, e.g., Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir.
1999) (holding that Spades’s depression was corrected by medication and
counseling and was not a disability within the meaning of the ADA); Mancini v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 Fed. App’x 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that
Mancini was not disabled because his epilepsy was controlled by medication);
McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288–89 (D. Wyo. 2004) (finding
that McMullin’s clinical depression was mitigated by medication and did not
present a “substantial limitation” on the “major life activity of working”); Robb
v. Horizon Credit Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (finding that
Robb’s depression was not a disability, because she was “capable of working and
[was] not substantially limited in any major life activities” provided that she
took her medication).
52. See, e.g., Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 507 F.3d
1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Most notably, the most severe periods of limitation
that Garrett suffered during her cancer treatment were short-term, temporary,
and contemporaneous with her treatment. A severe limitation that is short term
and temporary is not evidence of a disability.”); Ellison v. Software Spectrum,
Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190–91 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that Ellison’s cancer and
treatment did not affect her enough over time to be a “substantial limitation” on
the major life activity of working).
53. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 14, at 22 (suggesting that Sutton and
similar rulings demonstrate that the federal courts are engaged in a judicial
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commentators outside the disability-advocate community, was
that the Supreme Court’s decisions cut too deep a swath into the
ADA’s protected class.54
III. The ADAAA
A. The Path to a Congressional Override
Much of the widespread criticism of the four Supreme Court
decisions narrowing the scope of the ADA’s definition of disability
was accompanied by proposals for reform. The most far-reaching
proposal would have extended ADA protection to any individual
with an actual or perceived impairment regardless of whether the
impairment resulted in any functional limitation on that
individual’s ability to engage in any activity.55 The proponents of
this approach maintained that this change would mirror Title VII
in terms of focusing attention on an employer’s reasons for its
employment action rather than focusing on whether an employee
is a member of the “substantially limited” subset.56
backlash that is “systematically nullifying rights that Congress conferred on
people with disabilities”); Feldblum, supra note 28, at 161 (describing a “large,
gaping wound” inflicted by Sutton and its companion cases).
54. See, e.g., Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures
Cases: A Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1073 (1999) (arguing
that the Supreme Court’s ADA cases demonstrate a decision to exclude from
ADA coverage “some individuals whom Congress surely intended to cover”);
Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53,
54 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court disregarded the “rich legislative
history” and a “voluminous set of administrative materials” to conclude that
“individuals with impairments that have been mitigated do not have
disabilities”).
55. See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life
Activities: The Failure of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1473–74 (1999) (arguing that the
ADA definition of disability “should be replaced with a definition based simply
upon mental or physical impairment” and should include “a plaintiff’s record of
such an impairment, or a perceived impairment”); Feldblum, supra note 28, at
162–64 (discussing two ways that Congress could address the court decisions
that implement an overrestrictive definition of disability under the ADA).
56. See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 54, at 1473–74 (arguing that a disability
definition based “simply upon mental or physical impairment . . . coincides with
the reasons behind prohibiting disability discrimination in the first place,”
namely its “reliance on irrational, unsubstantiated judgments about mental and
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On July 26, 2007, companion ADA Restoration bills were
introduced in the House57 and in the Senate.58 The bills reflected
language that the disability community had crafted.59 Most
significantly, H.R. 3195 proposed amending the ADA’s definition
of disability to mean: “(i) a physical or mental impairment; (ii) a
record of a physical or mental impairment; or (iii) being regarded
as having a physical or mental impairment.”60 This proposed
definition of disability did not require that such an impairment
pose any functional limitation on life activities.61
A number of business groups expressed opposition to the
companion bills.62 In testimony before a Senate Committee in
November 2007, for example, a management attorney expressed
the concern that S. 1881 would confer standing on any individual
with an impairment, no matter how trivial, and that individuals
with minor impairments would be entitled to reasonable
accommodations.63 This blanket entitlement to accommodations,

physical impairments”); Feldblum, supra note 28, at 162–64 (proposing two
ways that Congress could correct an overrestrictive definition of disability under
the ADA and place “people with physical or mental impairments who experience
discrimination because of such impairments on a par with individuals who
experience discrimination because of their race, religion, or sex”).
57. H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007).
58. S. 1881, 110th Cong. (2007).
59. See Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R., 187, 197–98 (2008) (discussing
the introduction of H.R. 3195 and S. 1881 that “closely reflected the draft bill
that had been developed by the disability community lawyers”).
60. H.R. 3195 § 4.
61. See id. (lacking a requirement that a physical or mental impairment
impose a functional limitation on life activities).
62. See Chai R. Feldblum, Roundtable On: The Americans with Disabilities
Act and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 232, 234–35
(2008) (explaining that “a number of major business associations opposed S.
1881 and H.R. 3195” because the groups believed that the amendments included
too many people with impairments as people with disabilities).
63. See Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing on S. 1881 of the Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, and Pensions United States Senate, 110th Cong. 23–24 (2007)
(statement of Camille A. Olson, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP) (“Employers will
find themselves addressing accommodation requests from individuals with the
flu, with poison ivy, ankle sprains . . . and a myriad of other minor medical
conditions that go far beyond any reasonable concept of disability. There is no
limitation on the definition of disability under S. 1881 . . . .”).
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the attorney opined, would cause considerable difficulty and
expense for employers.64
Representatives Steny Hoyer and Jim Sensenbrenner,
sponsors of the proposed legislation, urged disability and
business leaders to work out their differences.65 From February to
May of 2008, representatives of these two groups held numerous
meetings and exchanged several drafts of proposed language.66
They finally achieved a compromise on May 15, 2008,67 retaining
the ADA’s current definition of disability but including several
measures designed to lower the bar for establishing disability
status.68 With only slight revisions, this compromise was enacted
as the ADAAA.
B. A Summary of the ADAAA
The ADAAA explicitly disavows the reasoning of the four
Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the scope of the ADA’s
disability definition.69 Although the ADA’s basic definition of
disability remains intact, the ADAAA emphasizes that the

64. See id. at 32–33 (explaining that by broadening the definition of
“disability” employers may be forced to implement extensive workplace
accommodations).
65. See Chai R. Feldblum, Hearing On: Restoring Congressional Intent and
Protections Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
200, 229 (2008) (explaining that “Majority Leader Steny Hoyer and
Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner urged both the business community and the
disability community to meet and see if they could work out their differences”).
66. Id. at 229–30. As the Statement of the Managers accompanying the bill
enacted as the ADAAA described: “S. 3406 is the product of an extensive
bipartisan effort that included many hours of meetings and negotiation by
legislative staff as well as by stakeholders including the disability, business, and
education communities.” 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
67. See Feldblum, Hearing, supra note 65, at 230 (discussing the work
between the business community and the disability community: “[A] final
compromise was reached on May 15, 2008”).
68. See Feldblum, Roundtable, supra note 62, at 236 (describing the
compromise made between the business and disability communities regarding
changes to the ADA).
69. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (detailing the purposes of the
ADA Amendments Act and specifically rejecting the Supreme Court’s
reasoning).
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definition of disability should be broadly construed70 and clarifies
and expands the definition’s meaning in several ways.
First, the ADAAA rejects the rule enunciated by the Supreme
Court in the Sutton trilogy “that whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with
reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.”71
The ADAAA, however, recognizes an exception in that “[t]he
ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.”72
Second, the ADAAA addresses the challenges that some
individuals have faced when trying to establish a substantially
limiting impairment when that impairment is episodic in nature.
According to a rule of construction incorporated in the ADAAA,
“an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”73
Under the original version of the ADA, the determination of
whether an activity constitutes a major life activity was left to
the EEOC and the courts.74 The ADAAA works a third type of
change by including in the statute an illustrative list of major life
activities. The activities listed “include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing,
learning,
reading,
concentrating,
thinking,
75
communicating, and working.”
In addition, the ADAAA
explicitly includes major bodily functions in the statutory
definition of major life activities.76 As a result, some individuals
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012) (“The definition of disability in this
Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act,
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”).
71. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3554 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 475 (1999)).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii).
73. Id. § 12102(4)(D).
74. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 30, at 34 (explaining that the ADA
“does not define key terms used in the definition of disability” nor what must be
done in the absence of an explicit Congressional definition).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
76. See id. § 12102(2)(B) (“[A] major life activity also includes the operation
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will be able to establish coverage under the Act without
describing the activities in which they are limited so long as they
have a serious medical condition that results in a substantial
limitation on a major bodily function.
Fourth, the ADAAA expands the coverage of the Act’s
“regarded as” prong. Under the amended version of the statute,
an individual is disabled under prong three of the disability
definition “if the individual establishes that he or she has been
subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity.”77 Accordingly, unlike the first and second prongs of the
disability definition, courts will not have to determine whether an
impairment functionally limits a major life activity when an
individual is alleging discrimination under the “regarded as”
prong.78 As a compromise for this broad coverage, Congress
inserted two important statutory limitations. The first limitation
is that the “regarded as” prong does “not apply to impairments
that are transitory and minor.”79 The second limitation is that an
employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation “to an
individual who meets the definition of disability . . . solely under”
the “regarded as” prong.80 As a result, employers will have to
provide reasonable accommodations only to individuals who
actually have an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity and not to individuals who are simply regarded as
disabled.
of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”).
77. Id. § 12102(3)(A).
78. See 154 CONG. REC. S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (“Under this bill,
the third prong of the disability definition will apply to impairments, not only to
disabilities. As such, it does not require a functional test to determine whether
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2012). The ADAAA states that a “transitory
impairment” is “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months
of less.” Id.
80. Id. § 12201(h); see also 154 CONG. REC. S8354 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008)
(statement by Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“[S. 3406] balances [the expanded coverage of
the ‘regarded as’ prong] by limiting the remedies available under this
provision.”).
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As a final measure, the congressional findings included in the
ADAAA state that the current EEOC regulations defining the
term “substantially limits” set “too high a standard,”81 and the
Act expresses the expectation that the “[EEOC] will revise that
portion” of its regulations.82 The EEOC has since issued
regulations implementing the ADAAA which, among other
changes, lists eighteen impairments that, in the agency’s view,
“will, in virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage
under [the ADA].”83
IV. Empirical Methodology
Two key factual issues that must be determined in any
disability discrimination case are whether the plaintiff employee
is “disabled” and “qualified.” Under the ADA, an individual has
standing to assert a claim of disability discrimination only if she
has been treated adversely on the basis of “disability.”84 In
addition, Title I, the employment chapter of the ADA,85 protects
only those “qualified”86 individuals “who, with or without a
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position.”87 An employment discrimination
plaintiff, accordingly, may succeed on a claim of discrimination
under the ADA only if she is “disabled,” yet “qualified.”
Following the Sutton decision, courts frequently rejected
discrimination claims through summary judgment rulings finding
that the plaintiff was not “disabled” within the meaning of the
81. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 2(a)(8), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
82. Id. § 2(b)(6), 122 Stat. at 3554.
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2012).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also Perrywatson v. United Airlines, Inc., 916
F. Supp. 2d 866, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (stating that “[a]n ADA plaintiff gets
nowhere unless she is able to show that she qualifies as a disabled individual
under the statute”).
85. The ADA is codified under five separate titles. While Title I addresses
disability discrimination in employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2012), the
other titles address such non-employment issues as access to governmental
services (Title II), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12150 (2012), and public accommodations
(Title III), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2012).
86. Id. § 12112(a).
87. Id. § 12111(8).
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ADA.88 The ADAAA attempts to reduce the prevalence of such
outcomes by commanding a broader construction of the disability
definition89 and by refocusing the ADA on issues of discrimination
and qualification as opposed to standing.90
The purpose of this empirical study is to determine whether
the ADAAA is indeed altering outcomes and fulfilling its stated
purpose of providing a “national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination.”91 This study attempts such a determination by
comparing all reported federal court summary judgment
decisions made under pre-amendment and post-amendment
standards issued between January 1, 2010, and April 30, 2013.
A. Identifying the Cases
The cases that form the basis for this study were identified
through the WestlawNext search engine from the online Westlaw
legal database. The search process involved the following steps:
(1) Within WestlawNext, the following two databases
were targeted: Federal District Courts and Federal
Courts of Appeal.
(2) The Advanced Search option of WestlawNext was
then used to narrow the search to those decisions
issued between the dates of 1/1/2010 and 4/30/2013.
(3) Under the “Find Documents That Have” tab, the
search terms “Americans with Disabilities Act” and
“ADA” were entered. The required frequency within
each decision was set at “1” for the former term and
“2” for the latter term.
(4) At this point, clicking on the “Search” button yielded a
total of 7,903 decisions.
88. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012) (“The definition of disability in this
Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act,
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”).
90. See 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of the
Managers) (stating that the ADAAA was designed to remedy lower court cases
that “too often turned solely on the question of whether the plaintiff is an
individual with a disability rather than the merits of discrimination claims”).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
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(5) The number of decisions was then further narrowed
by checking on the “Reported” box in WestlawNext
and again clicking on the Search button. This step
resulted in a data set of 1,289 decisions.
This study analyzed only decisions chosen for reporting in
either the Federal Supplement or the Federal Reporter series for
two reasons. First, this requirement resulted in a more
manageable number of decisions. Second, the reported cases
generally reflect the judiciary’s assessment that these decisions
are of greater significance.92 It is likely that courts take a greater
degree of care in crafting reported decisions as compared to
nonreported decisions.93
Because the WestlawNext search cast a very broad net, the
resulting set of reported decisions contained many cases that did
not fit the target criteria. The goal was to identify a subset of
reported federal court decisions that addressed summary
judgment motions relating to either “disability” status or
“qualified” status arising under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (or the Federal Rehabilitation Act).94 Toward that
end, each of the 1,289 reported decisions identified through
WestlawNext was examined to determine inclusion within this
relevant subset. This process eliminated more than 80% of the
reported decisions. Some of the more frequent reasons for
disqualification included (1) cases that did not arise under the
ADA, (2) cases that arose in a non-employment context under

92. See James Stribopoulos & Moin A. Yahya, Does a Judge’s Party of
Appointment or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the
Court of Appeal for Ontario, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 315, 323 (2007) (stating that
“depending on the circuit,” unreported judgments are “either considered to have
little or no value as a precedent”).
93. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private
Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1471 (2004) (stating that
unpublished opinions are “produced with less care and labor than published
opinions”).
94. The Federal Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by
federal employers, contractors, and grant recipients. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–796
(2012). Non-affirmative action employment discrimination claims arising under
the Rehabilitation Act are included in this study because Congress has
commanded that courts apply the same standards to those cases as apply under
Title I of the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 791(g).
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parts of the ADA other than Title I, and (3) decisions that
addressed non-summary judgment issues.
This process identified a relevant data set of 237 decisions.
Of this total, federal district courts issued 182 of those decisions,
while the federal courts of appeal issued the remaining fifty-five
decisions.
B. Coding the Outcomes
Having identified an appropriate set of decisions, each case
was then coded to extract relevant comparative information. This
coding took place in three steps.
The first step was to code these decisions as subject to either
pre-amendment or post-amendment standards. Pre-amendment
cases are those that arose out of factual circumstances that
occurred prior to the ADAAA’s effective date of January 1, 2009.95
Post-amendment cases are those that arose after that date.
The second step was to code information on those decisions
that ruled on summary judgment motions relating to a plaintiff’s
“disability” status. For district court decisions, information was
coded with respect to three characteristics. First, each decision
was examined to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim of
disability status was premised on prong one of the ADA’s
disability definition (i.e., a current disability), prong three
(regarded as disabled), or both. Second, the impairment or
impairments alleged by each plaintiff was recorded and coded as
being either predominantly physical or mental in nature. Third,
each decision was coded as to outcome, with the possibilities
being summary judgment granted to the plaintiff, summary
judgment granted to the defendant, or summary judgment for the
defendant denied. The last outcome usually reflected a
determination by the court that the existence of a factual issue
concerning disability status precluded an award of summary
judgment as a matter of law. The same basic information was
coded for the courts of appeals decisions, except the outcome
categories were adjusted to reflect the range of potential
appellate rulings—namely, affirm summary judgment for
95. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (stating the effective date).
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plaintiff, affirm summary judgment for defendant, or reverse or
remand summary judgment for defendant.
Step three involved coding the summary judgment decisions
that ruled on a plaintiff’s “qualified” status. Here again,
information was coded as to the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged
impairment or impairments and the outcome of the court’s ruling.
For district court decisions, the coded outcome options were twofold: summary judgment granted to defendant finding plaintiff is
not qualified, or summary judgment denied to defendant alleging
plaintiff is not qualified. Here again, the latter outcome generally
was based on a court finding the existence of a genuine factual
dispute concerning whether the plaintiff was qualified for the job
with or without a reasonable accommodation.96 At the appellate
level, outcomes were coded as either affirm district court finding
of not qualified, or reverse or remand district court finding of not
qualified.
While the resulting data set of reported decisions, as noted
above, consists of 237 decisions, the data set contains a total of
289 coded outcomes. This higher number of outcomes reflects the
fact that some decisions generated outcomes in multiple
categories. So, for example, some plaintiffs alleged disability
status under both prong one and prong three, and the court
responded by ruling on both allegations. Similarly, some
decisions contained rulings on both the disability and the
qualified issues. The district court findings set out below
generally reflect this larger universe of claim and issue outcomes.
V. The Findings
A. The Delayed Effect of the ADAAA
As a preliminary finding, Table 1 shows data concerning the
delayed effect of the ADAAA. Because courts uniformly have
96. In cases utilizing the framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), this category would include a ruling that
addresses whether an employer acted upon a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
assessment of the employee’s ability to perform the essential functions of the
job, but would not include a ruling that addresses whether an employer’s actions
constituted a causal response to the employee’s disability in other respects. See
id. at 798–807 (describing the correct analysis for use in discrimination cases).
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ruled that the ADAAA is not retroactive, those cases in the
pipeline at the time of the ADAAA's adoption and most of those
filed shortly thereafter were subject to pre-amendment
standards.97 Table 1 shows that it was not until 2012, more than
three years after the ADAAA's effective date, that postamendment district court decisions became more prevalent than
pre-amendment decisions.98 This prolonged delay in the
emergence of post-amendment decisions demonstrates the glacial
nature of nonretroactive legislative reform. It also has
contributed to uncertainty with respect to the actual impact of
the 2008 amendments. Not surprisingly, this delay is even more
pronounced among the court of appeals decisions with only six
post-amendment rulings out of a total of fifty-five decisions.
Table 1. Reported District Court Decisions by Year
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013 (4 months)
Total

Pre-Amendment
45
48
28
6
127

Post-Amendment
3
9
32
11
55

B. Disability Status
Not surprisingly, the most frequently asserted basis for
summary judgment in the data set was a motion by an employer
arguing that the plaintiff was not a covered individual with a
disability. Such a motion was at stake in 191 outcomes,
representing 66.1% of the data set. Of the district court outcomes,
approximately 76% arose prior to the amendments, with the
remaining 24% occurring after the amendments’ effective date.
Table 2 shows the outcomes of the district court cases. The
table shows that courts decided 74.4% of the pre-amendment
disability status outcomes by granting summary judgment to the
employer. The employer win rate in the post-amendment cases, in
97. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (indicating that the ADAAA
is not retroactive because Congress expressed no clear intent to make the
statute retroactive).
98. Infra Table 1.
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contrast, is only 45.9%. This represents a 28.5 percentage point
drop in pro-employer summary judgment rulings.
Table 2. Disability Status—Cumulative Totals Comparison

S/J for Ee
S/J for Er
S/J for Er
Denied
Total

Pre-Amendment
Number of
Percentage
Claims
1
0.9
87
74.4
29
24.8
117

100

Post-Amendment
Number of
Percentage
Claims
3
8.1
17
45.9
17
45.9
37

100

Although the sample size of the post-amendment decisions is
admittedly small (thirty-seven case outcomes), these data provide
considerable support for the proposition that the ADAAA is
having the intended effect of fostering a broad construction of the
revised disability definition.99 Indeed, there are at least two
reasons to believe that the data understate the actual expansion
in coverage. First, the data do not include the apparently growing
number of cases in which employers simply do not contest
disability status.100 Second, it is likely that the plaintiffs’ bar is
pushing the envelope by asserting more marginal claims of
disability status, thereby dampening the decline in employer win
rates.
Another area of inquiry concerns the prevalence of prong
three disability status claims asserted in the post-amendment
decisions. With the substantially lowered threshold for
establishing prong three coverage now providing “nearly
universal nondiscrimination protection” on the basis of

99. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of
Congress to broaden the definition of disability and reject certain Supreme
Court precedent that narrowed the definition of disability).
100. See, e.g., Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the employer did not challenge the disability status of the plaintiff);
Anderson v. Georgia-Pac. Wood Prods., LLC, No. 2:11-cv-110-MEF, 2013 WL
1788521, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2013) (same); Wynes v. Kaiser Permanente
Hosps., No. 2:-10-cv-00702-MCE-GGH, 2013 WL 1284320, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
28, 2013) (same); Andrews v. Mass. Bay Transit Auth., 872 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114
(D. Mass. 2012) (same); Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d 54, 69, 77 (D.D.C.
2012) (same).

2052

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027 (2013)

impairment,101 one might expect two developments: (1) that a
greater proportion of post-amendment claims would be premised
on prong three grounds, and (2) that such claims would be more
likely to survive summary judgment as compared to prong one
claims.102
Table 3 depicts outcomes in terms of the prong asserted for
disability status in both pre-amendment and post-amendment
cases. The data do not support the expectation of a greater
prevalence of prong three claims following the effective date of
the ADAAA. Among the 117 pre-amendment outcomes, thirtythree, or 28.2%, relied upon a prong three disability allegation.
The prevalence of prong three claims in the post-amendment data
set, meanwhile, actually dropped to eight out of a total of thirtyseven outcomes, for a rate of 21.6%.
Table 3. Disability Status—Cumulative Totals by Prong Asserted
Prong 1

S/J for Ee
S/J for Er
S/J for Er
Denied
Total

Pre-Amendment
Number of
Percentage
Claims
1
1.2
65
77.4
18
21.4
84

100

Post-Amendment
Number of
Percentage
Claims
2
6.0
12
41.4
15
51.7
29

100

Prong 3

S/J for Ee
S/J for Er
S/J for Er
Denied
Total

Pre-Amendment
Number of
Percentage
Cases
0
0
22
66.7
11
33.3
33

100

Post-Amendment
Number of
Percentage
Cases
1
12.5
5
62.5
2
25.0
8

100

101. Barry, supra note 10, at 208.
102. See id. at 274–75 (noting that the legislative history of the ADAAA
makes clear that persons requiring an accommodation will no longer have a
difficult time “demonstrating the limitation that needs accommodating under
the first (or second) prong”).
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The data also do not support the expectation that prong three
claimants would be more likely to survive summary judgment.
Table 3 shows a higher rate of employer wins among the postamendment prong three claims (62.5%) than among the postamendment prong one claims (41.4%), although the prong three
numbers are too small to provide a truly meaningful comparison.
A third area of inquiry concerning disability status relates to
the type of impairment alleged by the plaintiff. The conventional
wisdom is that plaintiffs with mental impairments fare
substantially worse in litigation under the ADA than do plaintiffs
with physical impairments.103 On the whole, mental impairments
tend to be more subjective in nature and severity, and engender
more reactions tainted by bias and stigma.104
Table 4 shows outcomes for disability status claims based on
the type of impairment asserted. The findings expressed in this
table do not support the conventional wisdom, but instead show
that plaintiffs asserting mental impairments in the data set more
frequently survived summary judgment than those asserting
physical impairments. Employers, for example, obtained
favorable summary judgment rulings in 78.3% of pre-amendment
cases in which plaintiffs claimed disability status on the basis of
a physical impairment, while obtaining a similarly favorable
ruling in only 60% of those cases involving a mental impairment.
The post-amendment rulings run in the opposite direction, but in
a substantially smaller set of decisions.

103. See, e.g., Michelle Parikh, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There
is Nothing Left for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to
Persons with Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 745 (2004) (describing the
added challenges faced by plaintiffs with mental illnesses that plaintiffs with
physical illnesses do not face).
104. See id. at 742–45 (suggesting that the lack of outward manifestations of
illness for some mental illnesses is “inherently more suspect, as many believe”
those mental illnesses are easy to fake); see also Stephen F. Befort, Mental
Illness and Long-Term Disability Plans Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 287, 290 (1999) (stating that there is a “general
widespread suspicion of mental illness and of mental health treatments in
particular”).
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Table 4. Disability Status—Cumulative Impairment Totals
Comparison
PreAmendment

S/J Ee
S/J Er
S/J D
Totals

Physical
#
1
72
19
92

Physical
%
1.1
78.3
20.7
100

PostAmendment

Mental Mental Physical
#
%
#
0
0
3
15
60
13
10
40
15
25
100
31

Physical
%
9.7
41.9
48.4
100

Mental Mental
#
%
0
0
4
66.7
2
33.3
6
100

The court of appeals data also show a very high win rate for
employers in pre-amendment decisions. As depicted in Table 5,
the appellate courts affirmed summary judgment rulings finding
a lack of disability status in 75% of the cases. The relative paucity
of post-amendment decisions at the appellate level, however,
precludes any meaningful comparison of outcomes arising before
and after the ADAAA’s effective date.
Table 5. Disability Status–Court of Appeals Decisions
Pre-Amendment
Number of Cases
Percentage
Affirm S/J for
2
5.6
Ee
Affirm S/J for
27
75.0
Er
Rev S/J for Er
7
19.4
Total
36
100

Post-Amendment
Number of Cases
Percentage
0
0
1

0

0
1

100
100

C. Qualified Status
As noted above, a principal goal of Congress in enacting the
ADAAA was to refocus the ADA on issues of discrimination
rather than on issues of standing.105 A common assumption
among many commentators was that the ADAAA would result in
more cases being decided on the basis of whether the plaintiff is
qualified for the job with or without a reasonable
accommodation.106 Table 6 presents data relevant to that
assumption. The table shows the number and proportion of
105.
106.

Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Supra note 8 and accompanying text.

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION

2055

district court summary judgment rulings based on qualified
status as compared to all district court summary judgment
rulings. These data show that the percentage of rulings relative
to qualified status jumped from 28.2% in the pre-amendment
outcomes to 47.1% in the post-amendment outcomes, providing
substantial support for the assumed increased focus on qualified
status.
Table 6. Issue for Summary Judgment (District Court Decisions)
Pre-Amendment

Disability
Status
Qualified
Status
Total

PostAmendment
Number of Claims Percentages
37
52.9

Number of Claims
117

Percentages
71.8

46

28.2

33

47.1

163

100

70

100

Table 7 shows outcomes with respect to the qualified issue.
In the pre-amendment cases, courts granted summary judgment
to the employer, finding that the plaintiff was not qualified, in
47.9% of those outcomes ruling on the qualified issue. The
employer win rate among the post-amendment cases rose to
69.7%. Although the post-amendment outcomes are relatively few
in number (thirty-three), the data show a hefty 21.8 percentage
point increase in employer victories. This increase provides at
least some support for those commentators who harbored doubts
about whether the ADAAA would radically transform overall
ADA case outcomes in a pro-plaintiff fashion.107
Table 7. Qualified Status Cumulative Totals Comparison

S/J for Er
S/J for Er
Denied
Total

PreAmendment
Number of
Percentages
Claims
22
47.9
24
52.2
46

100

PostAmendment
Number of Claims Percentages
23
10

69.7
30.3

33

100

107. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text (providing examples of
commentators who have described issues created by the reasonable
accommodation mandate in the ADA and commentators who have expressed
doubt about the positive transformative effect of the ADAAA).
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The case outcomes on the qualified issue also were sorted by
type of impairment. Table 8 shows that plaintiffs with mental
impairments fared less well than plaintiffs with physical
disabilities in the pre-amendment cases. Among the pre-ADAAA
cases, employers prevailed on summary judgment motions
related to qualified status in 44.4% of the outcomes involving
individuals with physical disabilities as compared to 60% of the
outcomes involving individuals with mental disabilities. This
finding stands in contrast to the pre-amendment disability status
rulings in which plaintiffs with mental impairments more often
survived summary judgment than did plaintiffs with physical
impairments.108 In a much smaller sample of decisions, the postamendment case outcomes showed very little difference in
outcomes for plaintiffs with physical as compared to mental
impairments.
Table 8. Qualified Status—Cumulative Impairment Totals
Comparison
PreAmendment
Physical Physical Mental Mental
#
%
#
%
S/J Er
S/J Den.
Totals

16
20
36

44.4
55.6
100

6
4
10

60
40
100

Physical
#
20
9
29

PostAmendment
Physical Mental Mental
%
#
%
69.0
31.0
100

2
1
3

66.7
33.3
100

Plaintiffs fared even less well on the qualified issue at the
court of appeals level. Table 9 shows that the appellate courts
affirmed 64.7% of the pre-amendment rulings granting summary
judgment to the employer on the qualified issue as well as in
three out of the four post-amendment decisions that addressed
this issue. Here again, the small number of post-amendment
rulings precludes the ability to discern any conclusive trend in
the post-amendment appellate outcomes.

108.

Supra Table 3.
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Table 9. Qualified Status—Court of Appeals Decisions
PreAmendment
Number of Cases
Percentages
Affirm S/J
for Er
Rev S/J
for Er
Totals

PostAmendment
Number of Cases
Percentages

11

64.7

3

75

6

35.3

1

25

17

100

4

100

VI. A Closer Look at Three Assumptions
A principal objective of this study is to determine empirically
whether the ADAAA is fulfilling three core assumptions widely
held at the time of its passage. As noted above,109 these three
assumptions are as follows:
(1) That the ADAAA will result in fewer summary
judgment rulings finding that plaintiffs lack standing
as covered individuals with a disability,
(2) That the amendments will result in more cases being
decided on the basis of whether the plaintiff is a
qualified individual with or without a reasonable
accommodation, and
(3) That the amendments will result in higher overall win
rates for ADA plaintiffs.
While the data described in the previous section provide
some preliminary information with respect to the accuracy of
these assumptions, a closer look at some of the actual postamendment decisions provides a richer context for this
assessment.
A. Assumption 1—Fewer Summary Judgment Rulings Denying
Disability Status
The federal district court data provides strong support for this
assumption. While the district courts granted summary judgment
to the employer in 74.4% of the pre-amendment outcomes
109. See supra
assumptions).

notes

7–9

and

accompanying

text

(explaining

the
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addressing disability status, the employer win rate in the postamendment cases dropped to 45.9%.110 This data, accordingly,
shows a 28.5 percentage point decline in pro-employer summary
judgment rulings.
This finding is hardly surprising since the key purpose of the
amendments was to overturn the Supreme Court’s restrictive
interpretation as to standing and to reinstate a broad construction
of the ADA’s disability definition.111 The decided cases illustrate
that the ADAAA’s expansion of the disability definition is working
largely as intended.
1. Mitigating Measures
Prior to the ADAAA, courts followed the Sutton decision by
considering the impact of mitigating measures in determining the
issue of disability status.112 As a result, courts frequently ruled
that individuals with impairments that could be alleviated through
medication or other mitigating measures, such as epilepsy113 and
depression,114 did not have a substantially limiting disability. 115
The ADAAA altered this analysis by providing that “[t]he
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative
110. Supra Table 2.
111. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing the
Congressional purpose behind the passage of ADAAA as memorialized in the Act).
112. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264
(11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the court looked at mitigating factors in determining
whether a disability existed); Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 2007)
(same); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 723–24 (8th Cir. 2002) (same).
113. See, e.g., Popko v. Pa. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594 (M.D. Pa. 2000)
(explaining that epilepsy is an impairment that is not a substantially limiting
disability because anti-epileptic medicine can mitigate epilepsy’s effects); Todd v.
Acad. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (same).
114. See, e.g., Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 889–900 (8th Cir.
1999) (explaining that depression is an impairment that is not a substantially
limiting disability because medication and other measures can alleviate depression);
McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1294–96 (D. Wyo. 2004) (same); Robb v.
Horizon Credit Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (same).
115. See, e.g., Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1264 (noting impairments that were
alleviated or could have been alleviated with medication or through other measures
were not substantially limiting disabilities); Wilson, 475 F.3d at 179 (same); Orr,
297 F.3d at 723–24 (same).
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effects of mitigating measures.”116 This straightforward command
has not been lost on the courts in post-amendment cases. In
Eldredge v. City of St. Paul,117 for example, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota denied an employer’s summary
judgment motion with respect to a sight-impaired employee who
used such mitigating measures as a magnifying glass and a pocket
telescope in performing his duties as a firefighter.118 Citing to the
2008 amendments, the court stated that “the use of such
equipment is not part of the determination of whether a condition
substantially limits a major life activity.”119 A South Dakota
federal district court reached a similar conclusion with respect to
two employees with diabetes, finding “genuine issues of material
fact as to whether each Plaintiff has an . . . impairment which
substantially limits a major life activity, without considering the
ameliorative effects of medication.”120
2. Episodic Impairments
The courts also have embraced the ADAAA’s expansion of
coverage for episodic impairments. Prior to the amendments,
many courts found individuals with episodic impairments, such
as cancer in remission, not to have a qualifying disability.121
Congress in the ADAAA sought to expand coverage in this arena
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (2012).
117. 809 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Minn. 2011).
118. See id. at 1029, 1040 (explaining that the availability of mitigating
measures was not part of assessing whether a condition substantially limits a
major life activity and denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment).
119. Id. at 1029.
120. Nichols v. City of Mitchell, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1058 (D.S.D. 2012);
see also Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d
850, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining in dicta that “impairments are to be
evaluated in their unmitigated state, so that . . . diabetes will be assessed in
terms of its limitations on major life activities when the diabetic does not take
insulin injections or medicine and does not require behavioral adaptations such
as a strict diet”).
121. See, e.g., Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. Of Trs., 507 F.3d
1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing plaintiff’s “periods of limitation” as
“short-term” and “temporary,” and thus “not evidence of a disability”); Ellison v.
Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190–91 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that
plaintiff’s “ability to work was affected” by her cancer and treatments, but not
enough “to trigger coverage under” the ADA).
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by providing that “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in
remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life
activity when active.”122
Several courts have relied on this amendment in denying
summary judgment motions relating to plaintiffs with cancer in
remission.123 One of the earliest post-amendment decisions,
Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc.,124 illustrates the
reasoning of these decisions. In that case, the employer
terminated plaintiff Hoffman at a time when his stage-III renal
cancer was in remission.125 The employer argued in support of its
summary judgment motion that Hoffman was not an individual
with a disability because he did not have an impairment that
substantially limited any major life activity at the time of the
termination.126 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana rejected that argument with the following explanation:
This Court is bound by the clear language of the ADAAA.
Because it clearly provides that “an impairment that is
episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially
limit a major life activity when active,” and neither side
disputes that Stage III Renal Cancer, when active, constitutes
a disability, this Court must find that Hoffman was “disabled”
under the ADAAA. In other words, under the ADAAA, because
Hoffman had cancer in remission (and that cancer would have
substantially limited a major life activity when it was active),
Hoffman does not need to show that he was substantially
limited in a major life activity at the actual time of the alleged
adverse employment action.

122. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (2012).
123. See, e.g., Angell v. Fairmount Fire Prot. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1242,
1250–51 (D. Colo. 2012) (finding the plaintiff had “adequately alleged” a
disability under the ADAAA because of his cancer diagnosis, but granting
defendant’s summary judgment motion on non-ADAAA grounds); Meinelt v. P.F.
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 643, 651–52 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
(recognizing the plaintiff’s brain tumor as a disability under the ADAAA);
Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1185–86 (E.D.
Tex. 2011) (relying on the ADAAA to find plaintiff’s renal cancer “capable of
qualifying as a disability”); Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc., 737 F.
Supp. 2d 976, 985–86 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (finding the plaintiff “‘disabled’ under the
ADAAA” because of his “Stage III Renal Cancer”).
124. 737 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
125. Id. at 978.
126. Id. at 984–85.
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This conclusion is further bolstered by the EEOC's
interpretive guidance. The EEOC issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to implement the amendments in 29 C.F.R. Part
1630, which specifically provides that “cancer” is an example of
“impairments that are episodic or in remission,” and is
therefore considered to be a disability. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g)(4).
Additionally, it states that:
Examples of Impairments that Will Consistently
Meet the Definition of Disability— . . . include, but
are not limited to—(B) Cancer, which substantially
limits major life activities such as normal cell
growth . . . .
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g)(5). Thus, under the clear language of the
ADAAA, the Court finds that Hoffman was indeed “disabled”
under the ADA.127

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina also applied a similar analysis with respect to a plaintiff
subject to episodic flare ups of multiple sclerosis (MS).128 In
denying the employer’s motion to dismiss, the court stated that
“[b]ecause none of the parties appear to dispute that MS, when
active, constitutes a disability, this court finds that [the plaintiff]
has sufficiently stated a claim that he was disabled under the
ADAAA.”129 Here again, the court found supporting evidence for
its conclusion in the proposed EEOC regulations listing multiple
sclerosis as an impairment that will satisfy the disability
definition in virtually all cases.130

127. Id. at 985–86 (footnote omitted). The regulations as adopted similarly
list cancer as a type of impairment that will be covered by prong one of the
disability definition in virtually all cases because it “substantially limits normal
cell growth.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2012). See also Norton v. Assisted
Living Concepts, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1185−86 (E.D. Tex. 2011)
(interpreting the ADAAA and final regulations to conclude that the plaintiff’s
“renal cancer qualifies as a disability even if the only ‘major life activity’ it
‘substantially limited’ was ‘normal cell growth.’”).
128. Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472, 481
(E.D.N.C. 2011).
129. Id. at 483.
130. See id. at 484 (“The proposed regulations then list MS as an
impairment that will consistently meet the definition of disability.”)
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3. The “Regarded as” Prong

The ADAAA’s revised treatment of the “regarded as” prong
represents the act’s most far-reaching expansion in coverage.
Following the Sutton decision, courts found that an individual
had standing under prong three only if the employer perceived
that individual as having an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity.131 The ADAAA drastically changes
the prong three coverage formula to protect any individual who is
treated adversely because of an actual or perceived impairment
without regard to the existence of any functional limitation.132 As
one scholar has commented, the revised “regarded as” formula
now provides “nearly universal nondiscrimination protection” on
the basis of impairment.133
Although two post-amendment decisions appear to have
erroneously continued the Sutton court’s construction of the
regarded as prong,134 the majority of decisions applying the
ADAAA correctly broaden coverage by jettisoning the functional
limitation requirement.135 The federal court for the Middle
District of Tennessee’s decision in Saley v. Caning Fork, LLC136
provides the best articulation of the revised prong three standard.
131. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)
(describing the necessary elements for a pre-ADAAA disability claim),
superseded by statute, Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012).
133. Barry, supra note 10, at 208.
134. See Rodriguez v. Sistema San Juan Capestrano, No. 11-1128, 2013 WL
1489457, at *4 (D.P.R. Apr. 11, 2013) (adopting a magistrate’s finding that the
plaintiff’s claim “must fail because she was at no time working with any
condition that could have been regarded” as a disability); Siring v. Or. State Bd.
of Higher Educ., No. 3:11-cv-1407-ST, 2012 WL 5989195, at *33–34 (D. Or. Nov.
29, 2012) (relying on Sutton’s “regarded as” prong analysis).
135. See Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that the
plaintiff “was only required to raise a genuine issue of material fact about
whether” his employer perceived him as having a disability, not the extent to
which the employer perceived it); Chicago Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Thorne
Assocs., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 952, 962–63 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (recognizing plaintiff’s
claims under the ADA’s “regarded as” prong because the defendant “improperly
construed [his] limitation as a disabling condition”); Saley v. Canning Fork,
LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 837, 849–53 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (analyzing plaintiff’s
disability claim under only the “regarded as” prong).
136. 886 F. Supp. 2d 837 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
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In that case, a new owner of a restaurant terminated a long-term
general manager who was diagnosed with iron overload in his
blood, an asymptomatic condition known as hemochromatosis.137
In denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the
court offered the following explanation:
Third, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not qualify as
disabled because “high iron levels in the blood is [sic] not
disabling for [Plaintiff] as it causes no symptoms. However,
Defendant’s argument is inconsistent with the logic of the
“regarded as” prong of the ADAAA. Congress enacted the
ADAAA with the specific intention to overturn the holding of
[Sutton] . . . Under current law, whether an individual’s
impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity is “not
relevant” to coverage under the “regarded as” prong . . . . Thus,
Plaintiff may recover under the “regarded as” prong in the
absence of visible symptoms, or any symptoms at all.138

This reading of the new “regarded as” prong clearly will expand
the class of those who can claim coverage under the ADA.
Given the significantly lowered threshold for establishing
prong three coverage, a surprising finding of this study is that the
data do not show an increased prevalence of prong three
summary judgment determinations following the effective date of
the ADAAA.139 Although the reason for this decline is not clear
from looking at the decided cases, two very different explanations
are possible. One possibility is that employers simply are not
contesting prong three standing claims because of the small
likelihood of obtaining a favorable outcome. A second possibility
is that post-amendment plaintiffs may be deterred from asserting
a prong three claim due to the need for a reasonable
accommodation in order to be able to perform the essential
functions of the job. As noted above, the ADAAA provides that an
employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation to a
plaintiff who has standing as disabled only under prong three.140
137. See id. at 850 (“Plaintiff has produced a medical record confirming his
diagnosis of ‘iron overload’ contained in the blood, also known as
hemochromatosis.”).
138. Id. at 850–51 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
139. Supra Table 3.
140. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the ADAAA’s
treatment of prong three to the definition of disability).
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More research and analysis will be necessary to determine if
either or both of these possibilities bear some causal link with the
prevalence of post-amendment prong three claims.
Taken together, the various changes in the disability status
calculus have significantly expanded the class of individuals
protected by the ADA. The first assumption associated with the
ADAAA’s passage, accordingly, appears to be accurate.
B. Assumption 2—An Enhanced Focus on Qualified Status
A second commonly held assumption about the likely effect of
the ADAAA was that the amendments would refocus ADA
litigation on issues of discrimination as opposed to issues of
standing, resulting in more cases being decided on the basis of
whether the plaintiff is qualified for the job with or without a
reasonable accommodation.141 The data set out in Table 6 above
provide significant support for this assumption. The table shows
that the percentage of summary judgment rulings on the
qualified status issue as compared to all summary judgment
rulings jumped from 28.2% in the pre-amendment outcomes to
47.1% in the post-amendment outcomes.142
The greater focus on issues of qualified status tends to follow
any of three paths in the decided cases. The first path involves
the apparently increasing number of post-amendment cases in
which the employer does not contest the plaintiff’s disability
status and files a motion for summary judgment only on the issue
of whether the plaintiff is qualified for the job, either with or
without a reasonable accommodation.143
A second path involves those cases in which employers
challenge both disability status and qualified status in summary
141. See supra notes 5, 8, and accompanying text (describing the second of
three commonly held assumptions regarding the ADAAA).
142. Supra Table 6.
143. See, e.g., Anderson v. Georgia-Pac. Wood Prods., LLC, No. 2:11-cv-110MEF, 2013 WL 1788521, at *6–7 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2013) (granting summary
judgment to employer on qualified issue); Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d
54, 77 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting summary judgment to employer on qualified
issue); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Creative Networks, LLC, 912 F.
Supp. 2d 828, 837 (D. Ariz. 2012) (denying employer’s summary judgment
motion on qualified issue).
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judgment motions. Prior to the ADAAA, it was not uncommon for
courts to rule for the employer on the former issue and never
reach the question of whether the plaintiff was qualified for the
job.144 With plaintiffs now winning a larger proportion of postamendment decisions on the disability status issue, however,
these courts by necessity must rule on the qualified issue as
well.145
Finally, even in those post-amendment cases in which
employers challenge both disability status and qualified status by
means of summary judgment motions, many courts now are
jumping over the disability status issue to dispose of the case on
qualification grounds. In the converse of pre-ADAAA practices,
these courts explain that it is unnecessary to rule on the
disability status issue because the plaintiff is not qualified for the
job in any event.146 This approach appears to be gaining in
prevalence as exemplified by several 2013 decisions.147 In a
variation on that theme, at least two post-amendment court of
appeals decisions have affirmed a grant of summary judgment for
the employer based on the plaintiff’s lack of ability to perform the
essential functions of the job, even though the lower court rulings
were based on a finding that the plaintiff was not disabled.148 The
144. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Wirey v. Richland Cmty. Coll., 913 F. Supp. 2d 633, 647 (C.D.
Ill. 2012) (denying employer’s summary judgment motion on disability and
qualified status issues, but granting summary judgment to employer on basis of
plaintiff “not meeting Defendant’s legitimate expectations”); Torres v. House of
Representatives, 858 F. Supp. 2d 172, 187 (D.P.R. 2012) (denying employer’s
summary judgment motion on both disability and qualified status issues).
146. See McDaniel v. IntegraCare Holdings, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 2d 865, 873
(N.D. Tex. 2012) (granting employer’s summary judgment motion after solely
addressing the qualified status issue).
147. See, e.g., Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 914 (8th
Cir. 2013) (“[T]his court need not decide whether [plaintiff] was disabled under
the ADAAA, because assuming, without deciding, that he was disabled, he was
not qualified to perform an essential function of his job.”); James v. Hyatt
Regency Chi., 707 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming the granting of
summary judgment because plaintiff’s disability “restricted him from
performing essential functions of his position”); Bennett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. 3:11-CV-0393-D, 2013 WL 1295338, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2013)
(finding that the employer defendant presented evidence that the plaintiff’s
“physical limitations would have prevented him . . . from performing the
essential functions of his job).
148. See, e.g., McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 2012)
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issue of disability, the basis for the district court’s rulings, was
not addressed by these appellate courts on appeal.149
In sum, the post-amendment decisions also provide support
for the second commonly held ADAAA assumption, namely that
the amendments would focus more attention on whether a
plaintiff is qualified for the job with or without a reasonable
accommodation, and less attention on the issue of whether the
plaintiff is an individual with a disability. By placing a greater
emphasis on the merits of a claim and less on the question of
standing, the ADAAA has recast disability discrimination
litigation in a manner more akin to litigation under Title VII.150
C. Assumption 3—Higher Win Rates for ADA Plaintiffs
The third and final assumption concerning the ADAAA's
likely effect was that it would result in greater overall wins for
plaintiffs in ADA lawsuits. The logic was that if a greater
proportion of plaintiffs survived summary judgment motions with
respect to standing, a subset of this larger cohort also would go on
to experience more favorable outcomes by litigation’s end.151
The database generated in this study does not directly
capture overall wins and losses. Instead, it tallies outcomes on
summary judgment motions relating to disability status and
qualified status. What this study captures, accordingly, is rulings
that can be characterized as either plaintiff-loss outcomes or as
plaintiff-survives-to-litigate-another-day
outcomes.
If
an
employer prevails on either type of summary judgment motion,
the lawsuit ends in a loss for the plaintiff unless that ruling is
(affirming summary judgment for the employer on the basis of qualification, not
disability); Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2012)
(same).
149. See, e.g., McElwee, 700 F.3d at 643 (affirming summary judgment for
the employer on the basis of qualification, not disability); Jones, 696 F.3d at 81
(same).
150. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (discussing how
proposals would have been more similar to Title VII in that the focus would
have been on the employer’s reasons for termination rather than whether the
plaintiff had standing).
151. See Jones, supra note 9, at 669–70 (“In practice, this means that
employers will face greater and more recurrent pressures to settle cases rather
than risk large judgments and expenses at trial.”).
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overturned on appeal. A plaintiff who does not lose on either type
of motion, however, is not necessarily a winner but instead is a
survivor with considerable leverage.152 Most ADA plaintiffs who
survive summary judgment negotiate some type of settlement
that results in at least a partial victory of sorts.153 Thus, the loss
and survivor data of this study approximate, but do not replicate,
win–loss data.
One way of measuring this data is to compare summary
judgment outcomes on disability status and qualified status
motions. If the post-amendment changes in outcomes for both
types of motions trend in the same direction, this necessarily
signals a movement in that same direction with respect to overall
outcomes.
This comparison does not reveal a clear overall path in this
instance because the post-amendment outcomes with respect to
these two types of summary judgment issues trend in opposite
directions. Summary judgment rulings favorable to employers on
the disability status issue, as expected, show a marked downward
trend among the post-amendment decisions. While employers
prevailed in 74.4% of the pre-amendment determinations, the
employer win rate fell by 28.5 percentage points to 45.9% in the
post-amendment decisions.154
In contrast, employers thus far have achieved more favorable
outcomes in the post-amendment rulings on the qualified status
issue. In the pre-amendment decisions, courts granted summary
judgment to employers in 47.9% of the outcomes, but this figure
jumped to 69.7% in the post-amendment outcomes, representing
a more than 21 percentage point increase.155
152. See id. (stating that an employer that does not receive a favorable
summary judgment ruling under the ADAAA “will face greater and more
recurrent pressures to settle cases”).
153. Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?: Employment Discrimination Litigation
in the Post-Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 184–87
(2010) (“In the 14 percent of cases that remain active after the disposition of the
motion for summary judgment, more than one-half . . . settle before a trial
outcome.”); Kathryn Moss, Michael Ullman, Jeffrey W. Swanson, Leah M.
Ranney & Scott Burris, Prevalence and Outcome of ADA Employment
Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 303, 306 (2005).
154. Supra Table 2.
155. Supra Table 7.
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These data suggest that the more plaintiff-friendly outcomes
engineered by the ADAAA with respect to disability status are
being partially offset by more employer-friendly outcomes with
respect to qualified status. These results also provide some
support for those commentators who have expressed concerns
that the courts could once again undermine congressional efforts
to
establish
a
national
mandate
against
disability
discrimination.156
This rather rough comparison of proportional changes,
however, masks the transformative impact of the ADAAA in two
ways. First, it does not take into account the fact that the
database contains far more summary judgment rulings as to
disability status than it does summary judgment rulings as to
qualified status. Indeed, almost two-thirds of the summary
judgment rulings in this data set (66.1%) involve disability status
issues. As such, looking only at percentage changes does not
capture the fact that each percentage point change in disability
status outcomes has approximately two times the numeric clout
as a percentage point change in qualified status outcomes.
Second, the above comparison analyzes claim outcomes
rather than case outcomes. Quantifying claim outcomes has the
advantage of generating data with respect to the type of disability
status prong asserted and the type of summary judgment motion
being decided. But these data, even though rich in detail, do not
provide an accurate depiction of case outcomes. Take, for
example, a plaintiff who asserts both prong one and prong three
disability status claims. A grant of summary judgment for the
employer on the prong one claim does not necessarily put the
plaintiff’s case in the loss column since the plaintiff would remain
a survivor if the employer’s motion on the prong three claim is
denied. Similarly, a plaintiff who prevails on an employer’s
disability status summary judgment motion will nonetheless lose
the case if the court grants the employer’s motion on the qualified
status issue.
A more meaningful way to compare losers and survivors is to
focus on numerical case outcomes. Table 10 depicts such a
156. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (“In short, the judiciary
that previously undercut the promise of the initial version of the ADA may find
similar incentives with respect to the attempted ADAAA expansion.”).
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comparison. The table shows that plaintiffs survived summary
judgment motions in 41 out of 127 pre-amendment cases coded
for this study. This translates to a survival rate of 32.3%. In the
set of post-amendment decisions, plaintiffs survived in 22 of the
reported 55 cases. The survival rate for plaintiffs in these postamendment cases rose to 40%, which is equivalent to 7.7
percentage points higher than in the pre-amendment decisions.
Table 10. Case Loss and Survivor Outcomes

Plaintiff
Loss
Plaintiff
Survives
Totals

PreAmendment
Number of
Percentages
Cases
86
67.7

PostAmendment
Number of
Percentages
Cases
33
60.0

41

32.3

22

40.0

127

100

55

100

The data set out in Table 10 show that the positive gains
made by plaintiffs in post-amendment disability status rulings
more than made up for the greater frequency of negative
outcomes in the post-amendment qualified status rulings. While
a 7.7 increase in percentage points does not represent a “radical”
change,157 it does corroborate the assessment of Professor Samuel
Bagenstos that the ADAAA “is a worthy effort that is likely to
make things somewhat better” for ADA plaintiffs.158 This data,
accordingly, support the assumption that the ADAAA will assist
plaintiffs in achieving higher overall win rates in disability
discrimination cases.
VII. Conclusions
Congress enacted the ADAAA in order to override four
Supreme Court decisions that had narrowly restricted the scope of
those protected by the ADA.159 While retaining the ADA’s original
157.
158.

Barry, supra note 10, at 209.
SAMUEL L. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 51 (2009).
159. See 154 CONG. REC. 17,740, 17,741 (2008) (statement of Sen. Tom
Harkin) (“This bill will overturn the basis for the reasoning in the Supreme
Court decisions—the Sutton trilogy and the Toyota case—that have been so
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definition of an individual with a disability, the amendments
included several rules of construction designed to expand the Act’s
coverage.160 The ADAAA’s self-stated purpose was to provide a
“national mandate for the elimination of discrimination.”161
This anticipated mandate was premised upon three widely held
assumptions concerning the ADAAA’s likely effect. These
assumptions are as follows:
(1) That the ADAAA will result in fewer summary
judgment rulings finding that plaintiffs lack standing as
covered individuals with a disability;162
(2) That the amendments will result in more cases being
decided on the basis of whether the plaintiff is a
qualified individual with or without a reasonable
accommodation;163 and
(3) That the amendments will result in higher overall win
rates for ADA plaintiffs.164
This Article summarizes the results of an empirical study
designed to determine the validity of these assumptions. The study,
which compared all reported pre-amendment and post-amendment
summary judgment rulings for a forty-month period, provides
empirical support for each of these assumptions. With respect to the
first assumption, the data show a significant drop in employer win
rates on the disability status issue from 74.4% of the preamendment rulings to 45.9% of the post-amendment rulings.165 The
data also support the second assumption with an increase in
summary judgment rulings on the qualified status issue as
problematic for so many people with very real disabilities.”).
160. See id. (“This bill has a broad construction provision which instructs
the courts and the agencies that the definition of disability is to be interpreted
broadly, to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA.”).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).
162. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the first of three
assumptions regarding the ADAAA’s impact on disability discrimination
litigation).
163. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the second of three
assumptions regarding the ADAAA’s impact on disability discrimination
litigation).
164. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the third of three
assumptions regarding the ADAAA’s impact on disability discrimination
litigation).
165. Supra Table 2.
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compared to all summary judgment decisions from 28.2% in the preamendment claims to 47.1% in the post-amendment claims.166
Finally, focusing on case outcomes, the proportion of plaintiffs who
survived summary judgment motions increased from 32.3% in the
pre-amendment decisions to 40% in the post-amendment
decisions.167
The data reveal some less anticipated results as well. First,
despite the substantially lowered threshold for establishing prong
three coverage under the ADAAA, the post-amendment decisions
show no increase in the proportion of prong three claims asserted by
plaintiffs.168 Second, and more significantly, the data reveal a
decline in plaintiff win rates in post-amendment qualified status
summary judgment rulings.169 These data suggest that the greater
prevalence of plaintiff wins in post-amendment disability status
rulings170 is being somewhat undercut by an increase in plaintiff
losses on qualified-status rulings. This preliminary trend may
suggest a continuing judicial unease with disability discrimination
claims generally and with reasonable accommodation requests more
specifically.
Despite these two cautionary notes, this study shows that the
ADAAA, for the most part, is being interpreted by the courts in a
manner consistent with congressional intent. While the preliminary
uptick in pro-employer post-amendment qualified status rulings
bears close scrutiny, the overall findings are that the ADAAA has
succeeded in expanding coverage, in refocusing litigation on the
issues of qualifications and reasonable accommodation, and in
enabling more favorable overall outcomes for disabled plaintiffs.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Supra Table 6.
Supra Table 10.
Supra Table 3.
Supra Table 7.
Supra Table 2.

